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The doctrine of dedication is of comparatively mod-
ern origin and is an outgrowth of the common law.
The principles which govern the law are peculiar to the
subject itself. Under these principles rights are
parted with and titles acquired by means unusual and
peculiar.
Ordinarily, in order to transfer the title to real
property, some conveyance or written instrument is re-
quireo. A dedication may be made without writing, by
act in pais, as ,jell as by deed. The .owner does not -.
part with his absolute or title in t le land. He is not
deprivea of his land but estopped from asserting his
right of exclusive possession and enjoyment. All rights
of property not inconsistent with the public use remain
in the original owner, and in case the public use of the
land is abandoned it revests in him.
it ias been said that "he principle upon which
the estoppel rests is, that it would be dishonest, irmfor-
al or indecent, anu in some instances even sacriligious,
to reclaim at pleasure proi)ertM w i ch has beon solemn-
ly devoted to the use of the public or in furtherance of
some charitable or pious object. The law, therefore,
'ill not perinit any one thus to break his own plighted
fait, to disappoint honest expectations thus e> cited and
upon which reliance has been placed. The principle is
one of sound nor,.ls and of most obvious equity, and
is in the strictest sense a part of the law of the land.
It is known in all courts and ma, be enforced as well
in law as in equity.
Public parks, bridges, squar, s and highways were
recognized and protected by the Civil Law but the Covil
Law contained no principle strictly analogous to didica-
tion under the common law. In Rome the individual held
the land subject to the ultimate ownership of the state,
dominium eminens, and whenever the public safety or con-
venience demanded,, the occupant if-ht be divested of his
estate by an exercise of this reserved right of dominion.
The public took actual ownership of the land instead of
an ease,,ent as under the cormon la.,.
In regar to the origin of the azoctrine Gibson, C.J,,
in the case of Gowen vs. Philadelphia Exchanf!e Co. (.5 W.
& S., 141), decidecd in 1342 says: "The first ti'ace of
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the doctrine of dedication is found in Rex vs. Hudson
(5 Stra. Mw,) decided in 1732; and the next in Lade vs.
Shepherd (id. 1004) decided three years afterwaru. it
was tken suffered to sleep till 1'/t0) when it was awak-
ened by Rugby Charity vs. Merryweather (11 East. 375),
and for the last thirty years it has been of all others
the. subject most frequently apitated in regard to grants
of highways and most prolific of decisions, without hav-
ing its ,principles very definitely settled."
Since the case above referred to was decideu the
doctrine has been recognized as an undoubted principle
and has become an important branch of the law.
Dedication applies only to public never to private
uses.
A dedication as defined by 11r. AnFell in his work
on Highways is an appropriation of lands: to some public
use)made by the owner of the fee and accepted for such
use by or on behalf of the public. If a dedication is
hate in pursuance of some statutory regulation it is
necessary simply to comply w-;ith the requirements of the
statute, and carry out its provisions in the manner pre-
scribed. The difference, in effect, between a dedikca-
tion at cori-on law and one under the statute is, that the
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former operates as an estoppel in pais while the latter
operates by ,iay of Fran' as a transf. r of an interest
in lands. The statutes usually provide that, like all
grants, it must be acknowledged and recorded; and if
these requirements are cumplied with it is no more ef-
fectual to pass the title or interest specified than a
deed which has not be acknowledged. But if a statutory
dedication fail on account of non-compliance with statu-
tor.y provisions it may operate as a common law dedication
if it is accepted and appropriateu- by the public.
In Ceuicating land to public uses at cormon law no
particular formalities are necessary. Any acts which
clearly indicate an intention to didicate are suffic-
ient: such as throwing ppen the land to public use,
dividing land and selling it in lots bounded by streets
designated on the map, or acquiescence in the use of
land by, the public. The vital principle is
the intention to dedicate and whenever this has
been clearly shown the dedication, so far as the owner
of the soil is concerned, is miiade.
In or ,er that the de.-ic--tion may be complete it
must be accepted and used by the public in the manner
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intended and this being shown the owner and all claim-
ing under him are estopped from asserting any owner-
ship inconsistent with such use.
In order' that a Uckication be valid it must be made
by,. the owner of the legal title. it cannot be made
by a tenant or trespasser-, a mortgagor or one holding
by adverse possession, or by a tenant in cormmon without
the consent of his co-tenant. The reason for the rule
is thz-t the owner o" the fee may be protected from pub-
lic easements arising from the unauthorized acts of his
tenant or one in possession.
in the case of Wood vs. Veal (5 B. & A. , 454) where
the action was for triespass for breaking; and entering a
certain yeara of the plaintiff and pulling uow, n his fence
which he had erected, it appeared that in the year 1719
a lease for ninety-nine years of the plaintiff's prem-
ises, including the yard in disput-e,had been granted by
the o-.ner of the fee. The lease expired in 1813 and
in 182O the plaintiff erected the fence in question.
As far back as any livin, -pnerson could remember the land
in question had beern usea as a public street, yet it
was hel that ther'e aas no dedication unless it could be
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proven that it was maue priord to the giving of the lease.
But a dedication of lanas to public uses nay be pre-
sumed from the fact of its long continued use by the
public during the continuance of a lease of the prem-
ises, where the owne" neglects to resue his rights as
revessioner for four or five years _-fter the expiration
of the lease. (Schenley vs. Coimonwealth, 36 Pa. St., 2cJ)
If during the perio that the public had had the use
of the land there has been a frequent change of ten-
ants, or if there has been actual notice to the land-
lord there will be a complete ueaication. The consent
of the owner will be implied. Thus in the case of Rex
vs. Barr (4 Camp. , 16) it was proven that the lina in
question had been usea by the public as a way for rire
than fifty years. Du 'ing that tine there had been a
fre uent change of tenants. Oe of those frequently
complaineu to t1ie stewara te:at the public used the foot-
way whereby the land was injured: but no action was
brou-ht by eitther landlord o tenant against ainy one
who useal it. Tie de fendant, the tenant, enclosed the
land in question ani ie was indictea' for obst.,uctin,- the
public foot-way. Lord Ellenborough, -aho decided the
case said: "After a long lapse of time and a f .equent
change of tenants, from the notorious ano. 'ninterruted
use of the land by the public, 1 sho ila pr'esizne that the
landlor. had notice of tue wav being used; and that it
,as so useu with his concui'm-ence!' In -his case however,
we have express evidence of notice, for notice to the
steward. is notice to the landlord.
If the fee is in the grantor a dedication may be
made by any private person, by a corporation if there
is nothing in the charter prohibiting it, and by a trus-
tee when it is done in turtherance of his trust. The
trustee is the legal owner of the land, but the purposes
for which he owns it are expressed in the deed creating
the trust ana he cannot by his acts be allowed to vio-
late such a trust. But of the trust is of an indefinite
nature and a discretion is vesteu in the trustee as to
the m:-nner in .hich the truest shall be carr'ied out, any
acts ,-iithin his discretion are lawful and b-ndinr'. So
if a trustee in f.i'therance .>f his trust dedicates lands
to public uses and such act is dkone for the benefit of
the trust estate such dedica tion is valid. The ques-
tion ;'hether or not such deuication can be i,,ade is one
of fact ana must be aetermine. , the ci 'c .mstances and
conditions of each case.
in England it has n,-. ve-, be-' n ueniec that the 'e lif-ht
be a decAic'tion of lands fPor a public hi,!h , av without
grant or cevenant. if a squa'e ,.ias desipnated. as a
mere enlarfei i nt of the ,;ighway and was intendeu to be
uscc. as such it would fall within the same catap-ory.
Eut thei-e coula not, especially by t1e early cot-i on law,
be a dedication for any other purpose. (21 .'ich., 319. )
Parks, squares~and other public Frounus were said to
rest upon grant or prescriptive right not upon dedica-
ti on.
The court ; of the United States have been more lib-
eral in their application of the doctrine and they have
specifically , lu that there might be a dedication for
public squares, for parks, walks and pleasure grounds,
for school purlIoses, for piots and charitable uses gener-
ally, for burial grounus, for chur'ch purposes, for court
houses and other public builuings.
in fact there may be a dedication for any purpose
1'hereby the public will be benefiteu.. The irinciple
iiay be applied to every use oL easement in lands which
can be of any service, convenience, or pleasul-e to the
curnmlunity at larT , and in many cases wliere the use was,
either expressly or fvo, the necessity u) the case, lirI-
ited to a small portion of t',e public.
As it lias b en before inti 1,,ateu tw o elerronts are
necessary to constitute a valia decication: an inten-
tion on the part of the owner to dericate, and an ac-
ceTItalnce of the dedication L, the public; anu if the in-
tention is not clear and uni-, istakable in its purpose
and decisive in ita character, and the acceptance ev-
iAenced by some unequivocal acts no dedication can re-
sit. Eo narticulai- foirmalities are necessary on the
part of the owner to show,, his intention, it mav be
sho-m by deecd or other overt act or. may be pr-esumed from
lapse of time. hqo clearer or better idea of' what acts
constitute a dedication can be obtained than by an ex-
amination of a few of the adjudicateu cases on the sub-
jec t.
in the case of Carpenter vs. Owyn (3j Hun, 3P5) the
plaintiff wh was the oviner of the foe, laid out a -'oad
anu woreL anu gradeu it a-, his own expense ana fcnced
it on both sides. ilen the road was first opened Fates
were placeu at both ends, which w,.ere maintained while
the plaintiff was gradivr, th~e intermediate poirr ins
of the road. For two ye' rsfrom 135 / to 1 t th'
gates we 'e t'Iken down to facilitate t11 e grding and
durinf- t;'at t ie the road 1.Vas used by the public. When
the Ffrading was complete,_ the gat s 'ere replaced.
Held, that the acts of tihe plaintiff aia not amount to
a dedication of the lanis as a public Iiiphwav. That to
produce that result the plaintiff must be shown to have
expressed by words or ly -.ctions,or both, his irrevoca-
ble intention to maLe the strip of land not merely a road
or way of passage but a public way. Ana also, that no
one h,d a rir-ht to infer from the removal of the gates,
undcer the circumstances, that it was the plaintiff' s pur-
pose never to re-lace them. No such presumption at-
_,cheu to the acts -nd no estoppel arose.
in Hagaman vs. Dittl,,an (034 Kas. 32) one Putnain, be-
in,_ in possesfion of a quater secion of land, the tit-
le to which he a;s seekinp to ac iui 1 'e inder the Homestead
Law, caused a small tract to be lain off as a burial
ground. Lot wet.e stake, off. corner stones set and
a plat ade. His int ,tion was to donate this tract
for a public burial guna for' the nei,:bo hood. The
public, with tVhe knowle4l,'e c nu consent o -" the Owner,
treatea this as a burial F'round and fr'om ,e~ar to year
buried their dead theire. After the lapse u:' ,he stat-
utory period Putnam acquirec. his patent from the fgovenr-
mont. It was hel that his acts at the time, torre-hei'
,,ith his subsequent assent to the use of the ground fur
burial purposes arno nted to a dedication which -aas bini-
ing upon him and those claiming under hirm.
As to the emount and kind of evidence necessary to
prove tne intention the authorities are n-umerous and not
all of them consistent. But the la,: in this respect
as in most other matters is reasonable. The peculiar
circumstances of the coutry must be taken into account.
The general rule is this same in this coutry as in Eng-
land, but facts which t'iere migh-t be consiaered suffic-
ient might not be so considered here. So, also, strong-
er proof is required in the case of roads in the coun-
try, than would be in the case of streets or lane in the
cit ' . Chancellor Walworth in the case of Livingston vs.
the City of New York (S Wend. 93) say s, "The rirht of
ray as a .nere rural servitude is confined to a conven-
ient passage from the property granted to the public
road or highway, and principles of construction applica-
ble to grants of pror.erty in the coutry do not apply to
conveyances of city lots." Ard Chief Justice Savage
has saiu, "There is a very proper dcistinction between
s,:)ants of property in the country and or city lots.
The roles of law applicable to th1e former are not so to
the lat ter.
But it is not only by express' acts or -ords or by
allowinrg the public an unrestricted use that a dedica-
tion :.a, be shown. Whoe,,e lands are mapped out and cer-
tain portions are designated as streets ano squar:,s, and
lots are sold accoraing to such map, it operates as an
irrevocable dedication of the streets and squares to pub.
lic use. It makes no difference whether it is by one
who originally layTs out , new town or one who sells
lots in an old one. 1.1erel; surveying ones own land
and layinf- it out into lots anu blocks wiithout any sale
would nut amount to a dedication; and a late case (4,Z
1. J. L., 641) holus that theire Must be not only a sale
but it must be an effective one -,ade so by a conveyance.
The City of Cincinnati vs. White (10 U. S., 1,/U) is
a leading case on this subject and 'i. Jus-.ice Thompson
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in aeliverinj the opinion o' the court, !'gives a valuable
discussion o-' Whe lu of dedication. It appeared f-om
that case that in 1713( the thr e persons having title to
tile land ;-het-e the City of Cincinnati now stands, pr.o-
ceeded to lay out the town. A plan was made and approved
by all the prop-'ietors and according: to ,which the i-round
lying bet vemn Front Street anu the river, and solocated
as to include the premises in qusstion, was set apart
as a common for the use and benefit cjf the town forever;
reserving only the right of a ferry. And no lots .were
laid out on the lna. thus dedicated as a corn on.
Aiiong, other thin -s the court said: "The rixht of the
public to the use of the comon in Cincinnati must rest
on the sai-ie p rinciples as the rights to the use of the
streets; and no one will contend that the ori-inal ovn-
ers after having laid out the streets and sold building
lots thereon, and improvements mad. coula claim the
easement thus dedicated to the public.
All public deraications must be considerea .-iith
refYr'ence to the use for which the are made; and streets
in a town or city may require a more enlarged right over
-he uoe of the land, in order to car']y, into effect t[ e
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parposes intendecd, than may be necessary in an approp i-
ation for a highway in ttie coutry: but the principle so
far as it respects the righ't of The oriFinal owner to
.isturb the use, must rest on the same grounu in both
cases, and applie- equally to the dedication of the com-
mon as to the streets. It 'aas for 'he public use and
convenience and accormnocation of the inhabitants of Cin-
cinnati, and doubtless greatly enhanced the value of the
private property adjoininF this comi:lon, and thereby com-
pensatea the ow,,-ners of the lanm thus thrown out as pub-
lic grounds.
After being thus set apart for public use, and en-
joyed as such, and private and individual riFhts ac-
quirea with reference to it the law considers it in the
nature of an estoppel in pais which precludes the orig-
inal owners from revoking s-ach dedication. it is a
violation of good faith to the public, ana those who
have acquired private property with a view to the enjoy-
ment of the use thus publicly p:ranted.
The rig-ht of the public in such cases does not de-
pend upon a twernty years possession. Such a doctrine
hi -hiwa s
applied to publi and the streets of the nu . erous vil-
lages and cities that are so rapidly springing up in
every part of our country would be destructive of pub-
lic convenience and private right."
Othev leading cases on this subject and which fol-
low substantially the doctrine laid down in the case abov
above mentioned are in re Brooklyn lforth Thirteenth
Street, 76 1I. Y. , 179: Clarke vs. Elisabeth, 40 N. J. L.
172: Schenly vs. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St., -2: Lockland
vs. Smithlv, 26 0. St. , 94.
The second of the elements necessary to consti-
tute a valia dedication is an acceptance by the public.
Sume courts hold that the me3re use of the premises or
property in question is sufficient to constitute an ac-
ceptance. Others maintain t[aat mere user is not suf-
ficient,while in other jurisdictions the atter is set-
tied by statutory enactment. (J& !!. Y. , 261; 36 lowa,
465. ) in states where acceptance i-ay be shown byr
user, thie-e is a conflict as to t:ie length of time nec-
essar-y to vest a title in the public. Some courts hold
that ther must be a use for the period of the Statute
of Limitations, while ot-e'rs hold a shu rte ' period suf-
ficient. in State vs. Tucke ', supra, thqe court said,
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"To establish a higrhvay by prescription th',)o must be an
actual public use, p:eneral, uninterrupted , continuec for
tLPc peioc. u -he _'ttute uf Livitations, under a claim
of ihllt. Wlile in llunter vs. Sand,! rill (6 hill, 407)
it was held thut no definite or certain period of time
is requisite to establish a dedic- tion. It does not
aepend upon lapse of time but on the intent of thae par-
ties, s nu this ri~h% be establishea by acts of the own-
er and tne public, unequivocal in their character,
though occurring on a single aa. i."
Many of the aecisions confound the user sufficient
to establish a das ication with that required to give a
r.ight by prescription. The distinction, however, is
clear. The intention of the om::ner is the d. cidirf ele-
ent. AF. inst his int. ntion to devote the land to the
use of ti-e public, vust be broupht a continuous and ad-
verse user for the period of limitation, to Pive the
public a permanent easement; and th t easc -ent is a pre-
scrimtive right. But if an intention to set aside the
land to the public use be shu(-n, a :-sei on the pa t of
the :)ublic is iursu:-nt to the dedication, and will in a
great majo.'ity of the s tat-es he sufficient eviience of
a complete acceptaLnce aci deuic%,tion, if continued
for tlv statutory time; anu in .i ny cases user fo a
1ess time is sarnicient. And tho p- the statutory time
may have elaLsea, yet the claim of 'iht under a aedica-
tion ma, be overthrown by showing that the o'.ner Uid
riot intend to dedicate. (Kyle vs. Logan, 87 Ill., U4).
The bes- rale would seem to be t-i t the use is re-
quirea to be of such curation that the public interest
unu private rights would be iateriall'y impaired if the
dedication were revoked and the uce aiscontinued by the
public. (28 A-,. Rep., 464).
Juage Butler in Guthrie vs. New Thaven (31 Conn.,
30'3) Fave a valuable discussion of the facts necessary
to constitute an acceptance. le said, "The whole mattei,
accept-a.nce, as well as dedication, ' s be-,n left by a
mf-ajority of the court to rest on the principles of the
com.-on la-, withi whicL it olrig:inated. These ,rinciples
autho-cize tiio gift, estop tie piver from recalling it,
and presume an acceptance by the public ,wnhre it is
shown to be of comion convenience and necessity and
therefore beneficial to them. For the purpose of slow-
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inm' that it is beneficial an express acceptance by the
town or corporation within vhose liiits it is situate
and who are li-able for it repair, the reparation of it
by the officers of such corporation , or a passive ac-
quiescence in the open public use of it is important.,,
The principal evidence ,iill be the actual usC of.i
it without objection by thuse wIjo are beneficially in-
ter..sted. (Green vs. Canaan, 29 Conn., 157).
The decisions requiring a formal acceptance by pub-
lic authority have arisen entirely in the case of high-
;rays. The question usually is as to the liability of
the town or district tc mahe repairs if no acceptance
has been proved. (4 Cush., 332 . IFor the must part
statutes hiave settled the matter directing what acts make
a road public, and when the duty to repair tie same rests
upon th. town or dist -'ict. But there might be a com-
plete dedication sofar as the owner is concerned .vith-
ot any duty to r'epair resting on the authorities.
Before a dedication is acceptea it ma, be revoked,
but having been rendered complete by acceptance it is
binding upon the donoi' and all claiming under him, so lor
as the land remains in the ase to which it was dedicated.
11)
(Curtis vs. Keesler, 14 Barb., 511; State vs. Trask, 1
Vt., 355. ) But th )uP U it cannot be revoked by the ao-
noi- it ma r be relinquished or discuntinued by the pub-
lic oi' lost by abandonment. Whenever the right to the
p'opeivty is Fiven up or where its use is abandoned, the
locus in quo r'everts to the original owner of the fee
or those claiming uder him. The fee has all -the time
v'erainea in the gi'antor though he has be, n estopped from
asserting his r-ight, but when tho estoppel ceases he
may reclaim as his own that which he had given to the
public and over which he had lost all control.

